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Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art
has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That
something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the
words of the act.
Oliver Wendell Holmes1
I. INTRODUCTION
Popular musicians frequently are recognized by the distinctive
characteristics of their sound. The unique timbre of a voice or an
instrument often immediately suggests a performer's identity.2 In-
1. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1902).
2. Musical sound best can be understood as being comprised of four factors: Pitch
(note), duration (length), volume (loudness), and timbre (distinctive tonal qualities). See
generally G. JONES, Music THEORY 3 (1974). To illustrate, a note played on an acoustic
violin has a different timbre than that played on an electric violin. Even though the sound
played by the violins may be indentical in other regards-specifically, note, duration, and
loudness-the electric violin's sound is smooth, while, in contrast, that of its acoustic coun-
terpart has a rough texture.
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deed, most have experienced an occasion where they were able to
identify the performer of a new recording the first time they heard
it played. Traditionally, copyright law has not protected these dis-
tinctive musical sounds of musicians, opting instead to protect only
the underlying musical compositions and, to a more limited extent,
recordings of those compositions.' Recently, a technology, which
allows others to use a musician's sounds, has mandated reexamina-
tion of the law's traditional approach to protecting a musician's
distinctive sound. This technology, commonly known as digital
sampling, is best defined as a technology which "allows any sound
to be recorded, recreated, and manipulated by computer."4 Once
borrowed, the sample is played frequently over the musical range
of a keyboard and ultimately used in new musical compositions.
The use of digital sampling to create new musical works
presents difficult intellectual property questions and necessitates
an analysis of the existing statutory and non-statutory protection
available to performers with distinct musical sounds. Part II of this
Comment examines the ability, vel non, of the Copyright Act of
1976 to provide musicians with protection for their sounds. Al-
though the use of another's unique sounds, sometimes called "sig-
nature" sounds," might strike some as an inequitable practice, Part
II concludes that the current Copyright Act is insufficient to pro-
tect performers from the unauthorized use of their sounds. Part III
then assesses the potential for the common law remedy of unfair
competition to protect a musician's sounds from the sampler. This
Comment ultimately suggests that musicians seeking protection
from sampling potentially may find refuge in the broader shadow
of unfair competition.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AND PROTECTION FROM SAMPLING: A
STATUTORY MISMATCH
Over the years, copyright law has been inextricably linked to
technological innovation. The scientific advancements of the nine-
3. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (granting copyright owners of musical compositions
the rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute copies, publicly perform,
and publicly display their copyrighted works); 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982) (limiting the rights of
a copyright owner in a sound recording to the right to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies or phonorecords; to prepare derivative works based upon the work; and to distribute
copies or phonorecords of the work to the public). For a discussion of the rationale behind
this limited protection of sound recordings, see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
4. Pareles, Digital Technology Changing Music, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1986, at C23, col.
4. The process of digital sampling has been likened to the cloning of a new musical work. Id.
5. Dupler, Digital Sampling: Is It Theft?, BILLBOARD, Aug. 2, 1986, at 1.
[Vol. 6:61
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teenth and early twentieth centuries challenged the ability of copy-
right law to protect the rights of the individual in original works of
authorship and inspired extensive judicial and statutory modifica-
tions of the law.' Most recently, the copyright regime has been
confronted with sophisticated methods of reproducing copyrighted
works, sometimes called "second order" technologies.'
"Second order" technologies have brought more than difficulty
in applying current copyright law; in addition, they carry the po-
tential to change fundamentally the way in which the law ap-
proaches intellectual property issues. For example, a commentator
once prophesied that future scientific advances themselves eventu-
ally would become part of the creative process which copyright law
seeks to protect.' Today, this prediction appears to be on the verge
of realization. While computers are not used to independently
"create" works of authorship," they are used increasingly by musi-
cians in the creation of musical works.10 However, the thought of
symbiosis between man and machine in an endeavor to create or
author seems incompatible with the conventional copyright con-
cept of originality; in fact, this concept traditionally has considered
creations which are entirely the product of a mechanical process to
be insufficiently original to merit protection.1 The concepts of
originality and authorship protect works whose origin lies in the
mind of their creator. 2 Mere mechanical reproduction of another's
work does not satisfy the originality requirement, no matter how
6. Note, Toward A Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement For An Advanced
Technological Era, 96 HARV. L. REv. 450, 450-51 (1982).
7. "Second order" technologies include photocopying, audio and video tape recording,
and computer-based information storage and retrieval systems. For a discussion of the im-
pact of such technologies on copyright law, see generally Note, supra note 6.
8. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 117-18 (1967).
9. Computer generated works are not creative in the technical copyright sense. See
infra text accompanying notes 11-13.
10. See Holden, Technology Steals the Thunder, N.Y. Times, March 29, 1987 at 22
(claiming that a small number of musicians, such as Stevie Wonder and Laurie Anderson,
have used digital sampling to make music which transcends formulaic uses of the
technology).
11. See, e.g., Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
copyright originality requires a work to be the product of artistic skill rather than manufac-
turing skill); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (holding that
plaintiff's photograph of Oscar Wilde was sufficiently original through the photographer's
use of lighting and setting to merit protection; but, noting that an ordinary photograph,
which merely mechanically captures a scene with no other contribution by the photogra-
pher, would not be original in a copyright sense).
12. For Justice Holmes, the slightest emanation of personality merited protection.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1902). There is, however, a de
minimis threshold for satisfying the authorship requirement. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 8,
at 45-48. See also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
19 891
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novel the reproducing process.13 For example, an exact copy of a
classic painting may exhibit tremendous technical skill on the part
of the reproducing artist yet may not be original or creative in the
eyes of the copyright law since the completed work does not owe
its inspiration to an artist. 4 Nonetheless, new technology, includ-
ing digital sampling, has the potential to function as a catalyst in
the creation of copyrightable work.
A. Digital Sampling: The Process
Digital sampling makes it possible to record a voice or an in-
strument, either live or from a previous recording, and to manipu-
late it with a computer so that it can be played back at any pitch
over the range of a keyboard."5 The technology allows a recording
artist to put the sound of any other artist into a song which the
latter may never have played, sung, or even heard. Hence, it is now
possible to hear the voice of Enrico Caruso singing a song written
years after his death or even to hear Jimi Hendrix's guitar backing
up a group with which he never recorded.'6
Digital sampling devices take conventional analog sound
waves, as captured on an analog source-for example, a tape re-
cording-and convert them, through a device called an analog/digi-
tal converter (ADC), into numbers (digits) on a scale which then
can be stored on a disc and read by a computer.' 7 Subsequently,
13. Novel means of reproduction are themselves, of course, protected under patent
law.
14. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.01[A] (1989).
15. See Pareles, supra note 4. See also Dupler, supra note 5, at 1; DeCurtis, Who
Owns A Sound?, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 4, 1986, at 13.
16. Placing the sounds of other instruments under the control of a keyboard is not,
however, an idea of recent origin. Medieval church organs with their trumpet and bassoon
stops were the first attempts at such musical versatility. Aikin, Digital Sampling Key-
boards, KEYBOARn, Dec. 1985, at 32. Later, the cinema organs of the 1920's were used to
create various sound effects. Id. These and other attempts to put the sounds of other instru-
ments at the fingertips of the keyboardist all suffered from mechanical limitations. Digital
sampling, in contrast, offers unparalleled flexibility in the sounds available to today's
musician.
17. Natural or acoustic sound waves are created by fluctuations in air pressure.
Through the use of a microphone sound waves can be reduced to analogous fluctuations in
electrical voltage-hence, the term "analog sound." Both sound waves and fluctuating volt-
age are smooth and continuous in nature. When an analog sound source is digitalized, how-
ever, the amount of voltage is represented by numbers at discrete intervals along the wave-
length. Therefore, a gap exists between any two digits on a digital recording which would
not exist on a smooth and continuous analog source. Hence, a digitalized recording is not an
exact duplicate of the underlying analog recording but merely a sample of the sounds repre-
sented along the fluctuating voltage waves-hence the term "sampling." The gap, or amount
of time, between samples along the wavelength is known as the sampling interval, while the
4
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the numbers can be manipulated by the computer through the use
of a keyboard and ultimately reconverted back to analog sound by
a digital/analog converter (DAC).
The digital sample itself is a short recording of a sound, vary-
ing from less than a second to one half of a minute in length, which
forms the basis of the sound the computer manipulates."' Concep-
tually, sampling can be understood as the breaking down of sound
into its component parts and digitalizing each element, thus ena-
bling a computer to separately analyze, reproduce, and manipulate
that sound. Once an analog sound has been digitally stored in a
computer, the computer can, through the use of a keyboard, alter
the pitch of the sample while preserving the underlying tonal qual-
ities. This process creates a "synthetic instrument" capable of
placing the sample's tonal qualities in an infinite variety of new
musical contexts. 19
In light of the foregoing description, sounds produced from
digital samples are entirely different than those traditionally pro-
duced by synthesizers. Musicians who work with conventional syn-
thesizers create their own sound from scratch, and, consequently,
their product will be unique and unlike any sound found outside
the studio. 0 The sounds produced through digital sampling, how-
ever, are dependent largely upon the underlying recording since
sampling apparently is unable to manipulate the timbre of sam-
pled sounds.21 Therefore, the sound a sampling musician will pro-
duce is determined by the underlying sound.22 This phenomena re-
converse, the frequency with which samples are represented along the wave length, is known
as the sampling rate. For a discussion of digital sampling technology see C. DODGE & T.
JERSE, COMPUTER MUSIC: SYNTHESIS COMPOSITION AND PERFORMANCE 25-31 (1985); Aikin,
supra note 16.
18. Pareles, supra note 4.
19. C. DODGE & T. JERSE, supra note 17, at 63. One observer has pointed out that
"[thanks to [digital sampling] you can now take any sound-a falling tree, somebody's
complete guitar strum on a CD-and make a virtual instrument out of it, reproducing that
sound at any pitch, in any combination, any tempo, on a standard electronic key board." S.
BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB 202-03 (1987).
20. Synthesizers produce mathematically pure sound waves through oscillators. In
contrast, natural sound waves have imperfections which give them a rough quality. This, in
part, explains the appeal of sampling since many musicians prefer a more realistic sound
than that produced by synthesizers. Aikin, supra note 16.
21. See id. Even if samplers could manipulate a sound's tonal qualities, it is sam-
pling's ability to capture the underlying analog sound's timbre that has made the technology
so popular.
22. Apart from its previously mentioned ability to change a sound's pitch over the
range of the keyboard, sampling also can shorten or lengthen a sound, play it backwards,
and even eliminate some undesired noises such as tape hiss and record scratches. However,
these changes are relatively minor, especially when compared with the creative possibilities
1989]
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sults because computers are not yet capable of the same level of
sophistication as the human ear and, consequently, the computer
alone cannot distinguish between the timbre of differing sounds."'
In other words, since computers are not yet capable of generating
the subtle differences in sound which provide the foundation for
the variety of distinct sounds audible to the ear, the sounds which
digital sampling allows a musician to produce are tied to, and de-
pendent upon, the intricacies of sound captured on the underlying
analog recording.2
B. Widespread Sampling: A Conundrum for the Law
The use of sampling raises difficult intellectual property is-
sues, especially for performers with signature sounds, the most
typical sources for samples.28 One highly publicized use of sam-
pling, poignantly illustrating the potential impact of the technol-
ogy, is evidenced in the musical theme for the popular television
show "Miami Vice." The show's theme, composed and produced by
Jan Hammer, features the sound of percussionist David Earl John-
son.26 Johnson has never played the "Miami Vice" theme; instead,
Johnson allowed Hammer to sample his playing of some unique,
eighty year-old African congas." Johnson's distinctive sound is
clearly recognizable in Hammer's recording; Johnson, however, has
received no recognition or compensation for the "Miami Vice"
music.28
synthesizers provide. The parameters of the tonal qualities a sampling device can produce
essentially are limited by the sample itself. Aikin, supra note 16.
23. For example, when listening to a musical group's performance of a song, the ear
can distinguish between the notes played by an instrument. It also can distinguish with
relative ease the timbre of the guitar from that of the piano. Computers, while able to dis-
tinguish differing notes, are not sophisticated enough to distinguish the fine differences in
sound waves which register in the ear as particular instruments. Aikin, supra note 16.
24. This is not to suggest that sampling reproduces the exact sonic sound pattern of
the underlying recording. Most sampling devices are incapable of such precision. See
Dupler, supra note 5. See also supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the differ-
ences between analog and sampled sounds). Nevertheless, although there is a range of po-
tential manipulation, the sound that goes in is usually the sound that comes out.
25. See Dupler, supra note 5. For another discussion of the legal issues raised by digi-
tal sampling technology see Note, Protecting Distinctive Sounds: The Challenge of Digital
Sampling, 2 J. L. & TECH. 273 (1987).
26. See Pareles, supra note 4.
27. Id.
28. Johnson hired an attorney to negotiate with the musician's union for the establish-
ment of a payment standard for use of sampled performances on recordings. DeCurtis,
supra note 15. The Union, however, declined to take up the matter, primarily because John-
son voluntarily laid down the track for Hammer. Telephone interview with William
Krasilovsky, attorney representing David Earl Johnson, (October 12, 1987). Other popular
[Vol. 6:61
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The "Miami Vice" dispute was only the beginning. Over the
last few years, several disputes concerning the ethics and legality
of sampling have arisen. In 1987, Island Records sued Next Pla-
teau Records alleging copyright infringement for, inter alia, digi-
tally sampling some language off of an Island recording artist's rec-
ord and then using the sample on an album released by Next
Plateau.2" Suits for copyright infringement also have been filed
against the rap music group the Beastie Boys for their alleged sam-
pling of drum beats of the 1977 hit titled "The Return of Leroy
(Part I)" and the words "Yo, Leroy!" for use on their "Licenced to
Ill" album."0
These cases have heightened the debate over sampling. Artists
using sampled material, as well as authors whose materials are be-
ing sampled, continue to struggle in an effort to determine who
owns a sound. The problem is not likely to disappear anytime
soon.
3 1
Sampling technology offers musicians unparalleled flexibility
in producing music. Rather than having to learn to play various
instruments themselves or having to pay session musicians for
their time, today's electronic musicians have access to a symphony
of sound on a single computer disc. Additionally, sampling is rela-
tively easy. All a musician need do is to record into the sampling
device an appealing isolated sound off of an analog source and then
to reproduce that sound on his own recording.32 Furthermore,
musicians also have been sampled. For example, samplers have taken the voice of Chris
Squire and the drums of Alan White, both of the progressive rock group "Yes," as well as
Phil Collins' distinctive drum sounds. Pareles, supra note 4.
29. Island Records, Inc. v. Next Plateau Records, Inc., No. 87 Civ. 8165 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Nov. 17, 1985) cited in Goldberg & Bernstein, Music Copyright and the New Technologies,
7 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, n.5 (Summer/Fall 1988). The case settled as Next Plateau agreed
to stop distribution of the record and to recall those already distributed. See Goldberg &
Bernstein, supra, at 6 n.5.
30. Castor v. Rubin, No. 87 Civ. 6159 (S.D.N.Y. filed in 1987) cited in Soocher, Li-
cense to Sample, Nat'l L. J., Feb. 13, 1989, at 26. The Beastie Boys are the subject of a
second suit involving sampling, which, in addition to claims of copyright infringement, al-
leges a violation of § 43 (a) of the Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, tit. VIII, 60 Stat. 427,
441 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982)), for false designation of
origin and false description. Thomas v. Diamond, No. 87 Civ. 7048 (S.D.N.Y. filed in 1987)
cited in Soocher, supra at 26.
31. Ad hoc solutions have included attempts to obtain consent to use the sound for
free or for a fee. See Soocher, supra note 30, at 26. Early attempts by a New York Musi-
cian's Union to devise a payment scheme for sampling were not successful. DeCurtis, supra
note 15, at 13. Given the intensity of acoustic musicians' claims that sampling is little better
than theft, as well as the irresistible ease and flexibility sampling offers, compromise ap-
pears a remote possibility.
32. Alvaro, What is Musical Property? The Ethics of Sampling, Keyboard, Oct. 1986,
at 10. This is perhaps a slight oversimplification. Some instruments sound very different in
19891
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steady decreases in the price of sampling equipment has made
sampling affordable to an increasing number of musicians.33 As a
result, and not surprisingly, the popularity of samples, particularly
samples of artists with distinctive sounds, has skyrocketed. 4
The ease with which musicians may use sampling does not,
however, imply a lack of creativity in producing music which in-
cludes the use of sampling. While several widely publicized dis-
putes involving digital sampling suggest mere gimmickry, 5 sam-
pling enables artists who adapt to the technology an unparalleled
musical flexibility because of a resulting wide selection of sound.
For the first time in music history, artists have an unlimited "aural
palette" at their fingertips.3 "
Many artists rightfully are concerned by the increasing use of
sampling. Developing a distinctive musical sound can take a musi-
cian years of dedicated practice; more importantly, professional
reputations often are built on the distinctiveness of one's sound."
different registers; moreover, one sample may not be enough to play over a five octave range.
Therefore, the dedicated sampling musician often must take more than one sample of a
sound and match them to the appropriate ranges of the keyboard. Aikin, supra note 16.
33. Dupler, supra note 5, at 74.
34. Demand for samples is so high that a "black market" for samples of popular musi-
cians has emerged in recording studios. Id.
35. See, e.g., supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. It is not difficult to under-
stand why the very limited use of sampled materials in these instances has not inspired
praise for the creative value of sampling. Though such minor use may not strike the mature
listener as particularly artistic, legal commentators would nevertheless do well to remember
Justice Holmes' famous caveat: "[ijt would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
to the law to constitute themselves judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations outside the
narrowest and most obvious limits." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,
249 (1902).
36. Holden, supra note 10. The diversity of sound offered by sampling offers to make
the technology a staple of the music industry of the 90's. See Bernstein, Sampling Chal-
lenges Copyright Theories, BILLBOARD, Dec. 19, 1987, at 77. While some uses of sampling
appear trivial in artistic value, original creative opportunities are not foreclosed. See
Vandeknyff, Team Uses Synthesizer for Video, L.A. Times, Aug. 23, 1986, at 23, col. 1
(recounting the efforts of two California electronic musicians whose use of a library of digi-
tal sampling discs allowed inexpensive experimentation with sounds, thereby facilitating
composition); Spurrier, Ancient Rock Paintings and New Age Music, L.A. Times, Feb 28,
1988, at 5 (describing New Age musician Steve Roach's use of digitally sampled natural
sounds of Australia's Cape York Peninsula to evoke images of aboriginal mysticism and
culture in a musical sound work). In a broader sense, digital sampling may serve to express
the pervasive ambiguity of the relationship between modern man and machine, underscor-
ing Marshall McLuan's famous statement that, "the message is the medium." See Holden,
supra note 10. In fact, at least one modern music group has made digital sampling the
mainstay of its sound. See Pareles, Rock: The Art of Noise, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986 at
C15, col. 1 (noting that the group The Art of Noise, instead of merely using sampling as a
novelty, consistently has placed sampling in the forefront of their music).
37. For a discussion of the significance of distinctiveness of sound in music and the
impact of sampling, see Alvaro supra note 32. See also Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d
[Vol. 6:61
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Unfortunately, digital sampling places that sound at the fingertips
of even the most inexperienced musician.
C. The Limits of the Statutory Scheme
A copyright owner's interest in a sound recording theoretically
embodies three distinct sets of rights: Reproduction rights, includ-
ing rights to produce derivative works; performance rights, includ-
ing the right to control the broadcast of recordings over the radio;
and rights to preclude imitation of a recording by others.38 Under
current copyright law, protection is extended to all "original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed from which they can be perceived or oth-
erwise communicated, either directly or with a machine or de-
vice."3  The Copyright Act of 1976 specifically includes sound re-
cordings as protected works. 40 However, due to the derivative
nature of sound recordings, 41 the Copyright Act extends less pro-
tection to recorded sound than it does to other forms of
authorship.
Section 114 of the Copyright Act denies copyright owners any
performance rights in a sound recording.12 Hence, while the copy-
right owner of a musical composition has exclusive performance
rights for that composition, a musician recording that musical
composition has no control over the performance of the sound re-
cording and receives no compensation beyond the original fee for
the recording.43 Section 114 does protect a copyright owner's right
256 (1962) (noting that well-known comic Bert Lahr's success was predicated mainly on the
uniqueness of his voice and speech pattern).
38. R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OiER Topics
BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS 512 (4th Ed. 1985)
(noting that the first right currently is recognized, the second right is under study, and the
third right is of questionable validity).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
41. See 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.10[A] (1989) (suggesting that sound
recordings are themselves copies of the underlying musical composition).
42. 17 U.S.C § 114 (1982). The law historically has denied recording artists perform-
ance rights despite the courts' usually recognizing that a performer's contribution to a sound
recording is sufficient to meet the authorship and originality requirements of copyright pro-
tection. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir.
1955) (Hand, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe performer has a wide choice, depending
upon his gifts, and this makes [his performance] quite as original a 'composition' as an
'arrangement' or 'adaptation' of the score itself .... ).
43. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, at § 2.10[A]. For a discussion of the economic signifi-
cance of a performance right to a recording artist see Performance Rights In Sound Record-
ings, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,765 (1978) (statement of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copy-
rights) (concluding that the free airplay of performers' records does not increase record sales
19891
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to control the reproduction of the recording and the development
of derivative works based on it. However, the right to control re-
production of sound recordings is truncated vis-a-vis other works
of authorship."' In fact, the Act specifically excludes any right to
control the production of imitative recordings:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound record-
ing under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to pre-
pare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the
sound recordings are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered
in sequence or quality. The exclusive rights of the owner of a
copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of sec-
tion 106 do not extend to the making or the duplication of an-
other sound recording that consists entirely of an independent
fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.4
No matter how similar in sound a recording may be to an-
other, if the imitative recording is an independent fixation of
sounds, no infringement has occurred. Congress' exclusion from
the Act of any protection against independent immitation implies
that a signature sound or style per se is not protected by copyright
law.4" Instead, the copyright owner is protected only against actual
significantly enough to offset the royalties lost as a result of non-recognition of performance
rights).
44. For example, owners of copyrights in literary works are given exclusive rights to
produce derivative works. These rights include protection from other literary works which
have a comprehensive, non-literal similarity or, alternatively put, those works which imitate
the copyrighted work without duplicating the actual wording. 3 M. NiMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A] (1989). Currently, copyright law fails to extend such protection to
sound recordings.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982). Section 114(d) commands the Register of Copyrights,
after meeting with representatives of the recording, entertainment, and other pertinent in-
dustries, to submit to Congress by January 3, 1978 further recommendations regarding per-
formance rights in copyrighted sound recordings. The Report of the Register of Perform-
ance Rights in Sound Recordings was submitted to Congress on the required date.
Performance Rights In Sound Recordings, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,764 (1978) (statement of
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights). However, Congress has yet to recognize such
rights.
Prior to the 1976 Act, a long line of federal and state cases held that mere imitation of a
performer's sound as embodied in a recording was not an infringement of any of a per-
former's property rights. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive, Inc., 362 F.
Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Davis v. T.W.A., 297 F. Supp 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Shaw v.
Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975). The current
Act appears to codify the old rule. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
46. The lack of protection against imitators has spawned an industry devoted to
sound-alike versions of popular recordings. See, e.g., Fantastik Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int'l,
Inc., 661 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981).
(Vol. 6:61
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rerecording.47 Therefore, recording artists have no exclusive rights
to any stylistic aspect of the sound fixed in a recording and only
have the right to preclude the rerecording of the actual sounds
contained on a recording.
In light of the foregoing, the determination of whether sam-
pling is better identified as imitation or rerecording is relevant to
deciding whether the Act may be interpreted to preclude digital
sampling. If sampling more closely resembles the former, then sec-
tion 114 is inapplicable by its own terms and sampling would not
constitute an infringement upon a copyright. In contrast, charac-
terizing a sample as a rerecording could render sampling an in-
fringement of the artist's recording.4" An analysis of the purposes
behind the protection extended to sound recordings under copy-
right law demonstrates how ill-suited the existing Act is for resolv-
ing the sampling issue.
1. Imitation Versus Rerecording
At first blush, the question of whether sampling falls within
the Act's rerecording protection appears to be a simple one. After
all, sampling, like rerecording, involves little more than the use of
machines. Under the traditional view49 of copyright authorship,
creativity is something independent of a mechanized process. If
digital sampling is described merely as the feeding of information
into a device which results in the ability to play it back at the
47. "The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording.., is limited
to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords... that directly
or indirectly recapture the actual sounds . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)(1982).
48. Even if sampling did constitute rerecording, the work resulting from the sampling
must be substantially similar in order to infringe another person's copyright. See infra notes
64-81 and accompanying text. Questions of whether sampling generally constitutes a rere-
cording of underlying sound recording under the Act, and whether any particular sampling
use is substantially similar to an underlying sound recording, are distinct and separate in-
quiries; the latter inquiry becomes relevant ohly upon a determination that sampling gener-
ally comes within the requirment of actual sound recapture embodied in section 114. The
legal literature on digital sampling is not lacking in claims that sampling is more akin to
rerecording. See, e.g., Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting
Against the Electronic Appropriations of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1732-33 (1987)
(arguing that sampling resembles rerecording or "dubbing" since it constitutes changing the
sequences of and the playing back of another recording's notes, altered by changes in fre-
quency); Comment, Digital Sampling: Old Fashioned Piracy Dressed Up in a Sleek New
Technology, 8 Loy. ENT. L.J. 297, 311 (1988) (arguing that digital sampling lends credence
to the claim that "[t]he ingenuity of the thief increases with technology."). However, the
authors of these notes fail to address the creative implications of sampling. See, e.g., Note,
supra, at 1726 (referring to the sampling musician as a "technician" who "exploits" the
sounds of acoustic musicians, who thereby become "victims of technological advance.").
49. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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touch of a key, then sampling resembles the unoriginal and infring-
ing act of music piracy.50 This view, however, overlooks the tech-
nology's creative potential and stretches the application of the
terms "recapture" of "actual sounds" under the Act.
The distinction in section 114 between imitative recordings
and rerecording reflects a supposition that the originality of a re-
cording artist, captured in a sound recording, is something which
merits copyright protection." Independent imitative recording,
however, does not infringe on the artist's creative contribution to a
recording since the mimicry is based upon personal, artistic skills
of imitation and may itself demonstrate a level of originality which
meets copyright standards.2
Originality in copyright does not require absolute novelty;
53
instead, originality requires nothing more than independent, crea-
tive efforts by an author.54 Such independent efforts do not, how-
ever, establish originality where the efforts merely reflect technical
skill at producing works which are not significantly different from
those of another. 5 Consequently, it is clear that digital sampling
more closely resembles imitation than it does duplication. Sampled
sounds are noticeably different from the original sound. A sampled
sound, if similar to the original, is manipulated in a way which
changes it from the original, thereby making the use of the sample
something other than reproduction of the original recording. In ef-
fect, sampling not only adds and subtracts sounds from the under-
lying recording but also changes the components of the original
50. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 857 (1976) (holding copyright originality requires more than a trivial variation,
such as might occur when translating a work from one medium into another); Durham v.
Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (skill used in manufacturing plastic wind-up toy
figures of Walt Disney characters held not sufficiently original). Record piracy refers to the
unauthorized duplication of musical works by literal rerecording. Prior to the enactment of
statutory protection in the early 1970's, record piracy was an unchecked, multi-million dol-
lar, black market industry. See Note, Sound Recording Act of 1971: An End to Piracy on
the High C's, 40 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 964, 964-65, n.8 (1972). See also infra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text (discussing how the sound recording provisions of the Copyright Act
were the product of a Congressional response to the rampant record piracy that was occur-
ring at the time of their enactment).
51. This is at least true with respect to the rights to reproduce and to create derivative
works, especially since duplicitous works add no creative value to the original.
52. See, e.g., Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive, Inc., 362 F. Supp 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (not-
ing that a monopoly on voice and style of speaking actually may impede progress in the
arts); Comment, The Twilight Zone: Meandering in the Area of Performer's Rights, 9
UCLA L. REv. 819, 821 (1962).
53. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, at § 2.01[A].
54. Id.
55. Id.
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sound, albeit in a limited way. Realizing that a musician using
sampling typically will mold the sound to fit his tastes by altering
the pitch, the filtering, as well as other attributes, it is clear that
the sampling musician has made a contribution of originality
which distinguishes the sampled sound from the underlying
sound."' Nevertheless, an examination of the circumstances sur-
rounding the legislative intent of Congress in enacting the Act is
necessary when assessing whether the scope of section 114 is broad
enough to proscribe sampling.
Congress enacted the sound recording provisions of the 1976
Copyright Act to protect performers and the record industry from
the deleterious effects of record piracy. Congress granted the pro-
ducers of recordings the exclusive, but narrow, right to make literal
reproductions of their recordings. Primarily, the legislation sought
to protect the commercial and artistic loss resulting from black
market sales of actual duplicates of another's recordings.58 Such
rerecording did not contain one iota of creative input beyond that
contained in the original. However, mimicry, unlike piracy, con-
tains elements of originality and creativity, and, consequently,
Congress expressly sought to preserve this form of artistry. By not
proscribing imitation, Congress expressly limited copyrights to
sound recordings. Given Congress' concern over piracy, and in light
of its adopting the "recapture" of "actual sounds" as its touch-
stone, it is obvious that Congress was referring to the most banal
of duplications such as pirating.
This interpretation is supported by the legislative history of
section 114, which indicates that the technical producer of a sound
56. The Copyright Act of 1976 specifically provides that producers of sound recordings
can be considered co-authors of the work through editing and electronically processing the
sounds. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982). Nevertheless, at least one commentator has argued that
section 114 of the Act should be read broadly to afford owners of copyrighted sound record-
ings protection from digital sampling. See Note, supra note 48, at 1733-34.
57. Section 114 of the current Act has it genesis in the Sound Recording Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1476].
58. The legislative history of the 1971 legislation evidences Congress' concern about
the record companies' and the artists' annual loss of millions of dollars because of the sale of
pirated records and tapes. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. reprinted in 1971 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1566, 1567 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 487]. "[The 1971 amend-
ment to the Copyright Act] ... provide[s] for the creation of a limited copyright in sound
recordings for the purpose of protecting against unauthorized duplication and piracy of
sound recording.... " Id. at 1566. In enacting the 1971 legislation, Congress made clear that
artistic originality, threatened economically by piracy, was the value it sought to protect.
See id. at 1569-70 (noting that only recordings which express copyright originality merit
protection).
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recording-the individual who compiles, edits, and processes the
sounds-may himself be an author of a copyrightable element of
the recording. s9 As such, it is arguable that electronic manipulation
now can rise to the level of creativity.6 0 Additionally, the Act de-
fines infringment of protected recorded sounds as the duplication
of all, or a substantial portion of, a recording,"' further demon-
strating a Congressional intent to limit protection to the piracy
context, where whole works were being stolen. Interpreting the
statute to proscribe digital sampling would produce results con-
trary to Congress' intent.
Digital sampling clearly differs from pirating in that it offers
creative flexibility to artists. Analogizing the technology to pirating
fails to appreciate the creative tool sampling already has become. 2
Characterizing sampling as a rerecording is akin to claiming a pho-
tograph is merely a literal duplication of the object photo-
graphed.13  However, the photographer and the sampler both
demonstrate personality in their finished product; the photogra-
pher arranges physical subjects and exposure while the sampling
artist arranges sound qualities. Simply put, the process of sampling
is substantially different from mere rerecording. The process offers
the modern musician a valuable tool for artistic expression and,
accordingly, sampling is not proscribed under the Copyright Act.
59. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 57, at 5669.
60. Id. However, there may "be cases where the record producer's contribution is so
minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable element in the work, and there may
be cases ... where only the record producer's contribution is copyrightable." Id.
61. "Subsection (b) of section 114 makes clear that statutory protection for sound re-
cordings extends only to the particular sounds of which the recording consists .... Thus,
infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial portion of the actual sounds that
go to make up a copyrighted sound recording are reproduced in phonorecords repressing,
transcribing, recapturing off the air, or any other method . Id. at 5721 (emphasis
added).
62. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (noting the potential for creativity
inherent in sampling).
63. In Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884), the Court
held that "Itihe Constitution is broad enough to cover an act authorizing copyrights of pho-
tographs, so far as they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the au-
thor." The petitioners in Burrows-Giles contended that the photograph in question involved
no authorship since it was merely the result of chemical and mechanical processes. Id. at 59.
The Court rejected the argument, noting that the photograph was an original work of art,
the type intended to be protected by Congress in the Constitution. Id. at 60. However, the
Court clarified that it was not deciding whether a photograph, which was the mere result of
mechanical reproduction of the physical features or outlines of some object, and which did
not involve any originality, thought, or novelty, was copyrightable. Id. at 59. The petition-
ers' argument is illustrative of a failure to grasp the creative potential of a tool because it
was a mechanical apparatus.
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2. Substantial Similarity
Assuming arguendo that digital sampling constitutes rerecord-
ing, it still may not infringe upon a copyright since the copying
also must be substantial. 4 Determining whether one work is sub-
stantially similar to another has been one of copyright law's more
slippery questions. Despite numerous attempts to develop precise
formulas,6 5 workable standards in determining the degree of simi-
larity have been elusive. Any line used to gauge the degree of simi-
larity between works necessary to constitute infringement will nec-
essarily be arbitrary.6 This being the case, the matter should be
treated as an issue of fact.
Similarity between two works will be determined either by
their comprehensive nonliteral similarity,67 or by their fragmented
literal similarity.6 8 The fragmented literal similarity approach,
which searches for the use of literal or nearly literal pieces of a
copyrighted work in another, is most applicable in the digital sam-
pling context.6 9 This approach typically focuses on the significance
of the alleged infringing portions to the plaintiff's work;70 usually,
the defendant's copying must constitute a substantial portion of
the copied work. The critical notion of substantiality can be de-
fined either in a quantitative"' or qualitative sense. 2
64. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 44, at § 13.03[A]. Of course, a plaintiff must first
prove that a portion of defendant's recording is a sample of plaintiff's sound. However, ex-
pert analysis of a sound wave's "fingerprint" can determine if defendant's sample was taken
from plaintiff. GOLDBERG & BERNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 4.
65. The test most frequently implemented is the ordinary observer test, which re-
quires that the ordinary, reasonable man should be able to detect the copying without aid or
suggestion from others. See, e.g., Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933),
cert. dismissed, 54 S. Ct. 94 (1934). Permutations of the ordinary observer test have been
numerous. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (breaking the substantial
similarity test into two separate elements; copying is first established by comparing the two
works in their entirety, followed by a jury determination of whether defendant's copying
took so much from the plaintiff's work that an unlawful appropriation occurred); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir
1977) (using a two prong similarity test which inquired into 1) whether the two works were
similar in their general ideas and then 2) whether those ideas were expressed similarly in
the eyes of a jury). See generally 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 44, at § 13.03[E].
66. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931).
67. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 44, at § 13.03[A].
68. See id.
69. Comprehensive nonliteral similarity is applicable because it concerns similarity in
which the "fundamental essence" of one work pervades another. Id. at § 13.03[A][1].
70. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672
F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). See generally 3 M. NiMMER, supra
note 44, at § 13.03[A][2] (discussing the fragmented literal similarity approach).
71. The quantum of copying permitted varies from case to case. See, e.g., Marks v.
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The Ninth Circuit had occasion to apply the substantial simi-
larity test to sound recordings in United States v. Taxe. 5 In Taxe,
the court considered, inter alia, whether a rerecording of copy-
righted recordings of musical performances infringed on the copy-
right owner's reproduction rights when one or more of the follow-
ing changes were made in the original recording: The addition of
echoes and reverberations; increased and decreased speed; elimina-
tion and reduction of volume of certain sounds; and the addition of
new sounds through a synthesizer. 4 The court held that the deter-
mination of whether the rerecording constituted an infringing re-
production of the original work was a jury question as it turned
upon a finding of substantial similarity. 5
Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959 (2d Cir. 1923) (copying of six bars from musical composition held
not actionable); Robertson v. Batten, Barten and Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal.
1956) (copying of two bars from musical composition held to be an infringement).
72. See, e.g., Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding copying of
only 0.8% of plaintiff's work could be an infringement if qualitatively important to the
work).
73. 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040, reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
1124 (1977).
74. Id. at 961. One commentator has argued that since the court in Taxe found de-
fendant's rerecording could infringe upon plaintiff's copyright despite the addition of sound
effects, the decision implicitly supports the view that changing the sounds contained on
another recording, and by analogy digital sampling, constitutes rerecording and not imita-
tion. Note, supra note 48, at 1732. However, in Taxe, neither the court of appeals nor the
district court ever confronted the threshold inquiry of whether the defendant's acts were
independent fixations or rerecording; instead, both courts assumed that the defendant's
work was a rerecording and, consequently, they directed their efforts toward deciding
whether a rerecording alone could constitute infringement or whether, instead, substantial
similarity was required. United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Taxe,
540 F.2d at 964. The district court framed the issue as being "what effect, if any, do changes
made by the re-recorder . . . have on the offense of infringement." 380 F. Supp. at 1012
(emphasis added). The district court concluded that any rerecording constituted an in-
fringement. Id. at 1014. However, the court of appeals vacated the portion of the district
court's decision holding all rerecording to be infringements. Taxe, 540 F.2d at 961. The
court of appeals determined that the proper analysis was one of substantial similarity, but
found that the district court's jury instruction, which provided for a comparison of the two
works, cured any error. Id. at 965. The Ninth Circuit, however, never doubted that it was
dealing with an instance of rerecording: "[The district court's] instruction went beyond the
law insofar as it purported to characterize any and all re-recordings as infringements, but
the subsequent inclusion of a comparison test permitted the jury to consider 'substantial
similarity', and cured any error.... Id. at 965. This assumption apparently was predicated
upon expert trial testimony that defendant's work was a rerecording. 380 F. Supp. at 1014.
Additionally, given that the defendant's acts clearly constituted piracy, it is understandable
that neither court felt a need to inquire whether the defendant's works were "imitations,"
and therefore that the only relevant infringement question was whether the works were sub-
stantially similar.
75. 540 F.2d at 965. The district court itself assumed that if substantial similarity
were a prerequisite to proving infringement, the plaintiff would have to show fragmented
literal similarity. 380 F. Supp. at 1014.
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The Taxe decision demonstrates the uncertain nature of sub-
stantial similarity inquiries. Even under the egregious circum-
stances of that case-the defendant had rerecorded the entire work
of another-the issue of substantial similarity was still a question
of fact, the ultimate resolution of which depended upon the aver-
age lay person's ability to recognize the two works as significantly
alike, despite the defendant's changes. Therefore, it is conceivable
that a rerecording may alter a sound recording substantially
enough that a reasonable juror would be unable to recognize any
significant resemblance between the two works. Moreover, if the
alteration in sound is accompanied by the use of only a very small
portion of the original recording, the likelihood of a jury finding
substantial similarity becomes even more remote. Although gener-
alizations in this area are ill-advised, it is clear beyond cavil that a
plaintiff who attempts to convince a jury that a defendant's use of
a few seconds of the plaintiff's sound recording constitutes sub-
stantial similarity, faces a difficult task. This is especially so where
those few seconds of sound have been altered materially in pitch,
duration, and intensity. In sum, given the inconsistent results of
substantial similarity findings in other contexts,7 6 a musician who
seeks protection from digital sampling through traditional infringe-
ment doctrines, hangs his hat on a very uncertain peg.
Although Taxe predated the enactment of the 1976 Copyright
Act, the decision is consistent with the legislative history of section
114." In enacting the Act, Congress sought to address the rere-
cording problem without unduly restricting other creative endeav-
ors. 8 Therefore, Congress limited the duplication rights of copy-
right owners in sound recordings to the right to make copies of a
copyrighted work.79 Moreover, Congress clearly manifested its in-
tention to provide protection only against the rerecording of all or
significant portions of a copyrighted sound recording:
Subsection (b) of section 114 makes clear that statutory protec-
tion for sound recordings extends only to the particular sound of
which the recording consists, and would not prevent a separate
recording of another performance in which those sounds are imi-
tated. Thus, infringement takes place whenever all or any sub-
76. See supra note 77.
77. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
79. Section 114 of the Copyright Act limits the rights of copyright owners in sound
recordings to those granted under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(3) (1982). Section 106(1) refers to
the reproduction of copyrighted "works" in copies or phonorecords. 17 U.S.C § 106(1)
(1982).
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stantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copy-
righted sound recording are reproduced .... o.
A sample typically constitutes only a minuscule portion of the un-
derlying work. Since Congress apparently sought to prevent only
the copying of large chunks of a work, it would be difficult to argue
that a short digital sample, constituting three, two, or even one
note, is "substantial" in any quantitative sense. While it might be
tempting to argue that the sample, however short, is qualitatively
substantial, the legislative history and the clear language of section
114 suggest qualitative substantiality is not sufficient to constitute
infringement. The phrase "all or a substantial portion," given its
natural meaning, implies a quantitative limitation." In light of the
foregoing, even if one assumed that digital sampling constituted
rerecording, a short digital sample of a copyrighted recording
would not constitute infringement within the meaning of the Act
because the copy would not be quantitatively substantial.
3. Protected Expressions
To demonstrate the statutory and doctrinal inadequacies of
current copyright law as applied to digital sampling, the foregoing
discussion of substantial similarity was undertaken with the as-
sumption that digital sampling takes something from underlying
recordings, which if taken in a substantial fashion constitutes in-
fringement. Indeed, any analysis of the issue which characterizes
sampling as an infringing use must assume that sampling copies a
component of a sound recording which the law protects. Digital
sampling, however, reaches beyond the scope of copyright law by
taking something which the Act never contemplated
protecting-style.82
The goal of the sampling artist is not to recapture the actual
sounds of another musician. Unlike the defendant in Taxe, a sam-
pling artist does not take exact sonic reproductions of sound re-
cordings, add some high tech fluff, and call it his own. Digital sam-
pling's main appeal is that it can do more." In actuality, the
80. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 57, at 5721 (emphasis added).
81. This meaning of the phrase is clarified when one considers it in light of the perva-
sive record piracy which was occurring in the years prior to the sections enactment. See
supra note 57 and accompanying text.
82. It is axiomatic that copyright law does not protect the abstract; instead, it protects
only concrete expressions. For example, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982), which provides that
copyright protection does not extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery regardless of how expressed.
83. See C. DODGE & T. JERSE, supra note 17; S. BRAND, supra note 19.
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sampler changes certain components of the sound while retaining
the original timbre.84 In this way sampling captures the unique as-
pect of a performer's sound-his vocal or instrumental style. 5
The idea of providing copyright protection to a portion of a
work as small and intangible as a single note or tone is quite for-
eign to the current copyright framework. Only when groups of
sounds are taken together do they form an expression meriting
copyright protection. Section 101 defines sound recordings as
works which result in the fixation of a "series of musical, spoken,
or other sounds .. .. *"'I While digital samples are sometimes pro-
duced from more than a single note, multi-note samples are typi-
cally unnecessary." Under the Act's definition of sound record-
ings,88 use of a single note from a copyrighted recording seemingly
would not be prohibited. The regulations for application for copy-
right, formulated by the Copyright Office, support this interpreta-
tion. 9 In its regulations, the Copyright Office gives examples of
things not subject to copyright under the Act.9 ' One such example
is a single word.9' Analogizing words within literary works to notes
within musical works, it is clear that that an individual musical
note as a sound recording is not protected from conventional rere-
cording. As a corollary of the foregoing, a musical note should not
be protected against use in digital sampling.2
To summarize, second order technologies present a challenge
which necessitates innovative interpretation of the Copyright Act
of 1976. Although the Act extends some protection to recorded
sound, the protection is limited when compared to the protection
the Act affords other forms of authorship. Specifically, Congress
did not provide a right to control the production of imitative sound
recordings; instead, the Act only proscribes rerecording. Since sam-
pling is significantly different from mere rerecording, the Act does
84. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
85. A performer's style permeates the smallest unit of a performance-viz., a single
note or tone.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
87. Pareles, supra note 4.
88. Section 101 defines sound recordings as "works that result from the fixation of a
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds ...." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
89. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1987).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. As one commentator concluded, "[c]opyright ... doesn't protect ideas or informa-
tion or methods, but the concrete expression of those ideas. It protects works and not words
and not a tone." Kidder, Copyrighting Intellectual Property, Christian Science Monitor,
Dec. 7, 1987, at 21 (quoting Mihaly Fiscor, Director, Copyright Division, World Intellectual
Property Organization) (emphasis in original).
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not apply to protect performers' sounds from the sampler. More-
over, even if one assumes that digital sampling does constitute
rerecording, a short sample extracted from a copyrighted recording
would not be infringing within the meaning of the Act because the
copy would not be quantitatively substantial. Finally, the Act falls
short because digital sampling, insofar as it borrows style from the
sampled artist, takes something which Congress never sought to
protect in enacting the copyright framework.
III. PROTECTION UNDER COMMON LAW ACTION FOR UNFAIR
COMPETITION
A. The Tort of Passing Off
Despite federal copyright law's inability to protect musicians
from digital sampling, performers' interests in their signature
sounds may receive protection from imitation under various com-
mon law causes of action."3 Particularly well suited may be the tort
of unfair competition. 4 The doctrine of unfair competition is com-
93. Several authors have suggested that the right of publicity, a cause of action based
upon a wrongful appropriation of a plaintiff's identity, may be a means of protecting per-
former's unique stylistic qualities. See, e.g., Note, Commercial Sound-Alikes: An Argument
For A Performer's Cause of Action, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 647 (1988); Note, supra note 48. A
broad right of publicity action, however, may preclude otherwise permissible forms of mim-
icry since publicity rights turn on the right to control the use of a personae regardless of
whether or not confusion is caused. See Note, The Right of Publicity As A Means of Pro-
tecting Performer's Style, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 129, 151 (1980) (arguing that recognition of a
broad right of publicity would preclude imitation and that the right must therefore be lim-
ited to actions against advertisers who imitate for commercial gain).
94. Unfair competition has been described as the "vigorous and sometimes unconfined
companion of copyright law." R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, supra note 38, at 439. While a
discussion of federal preemption of common law actions is beyond the scope of this article,
it is fair to note that the effect of the current Copyright Act is highly uncertain. Id. at 483-
93. In one recent case the Ninth Circuit held that a professional singer's cause of action,
arising out of a sound-alike's performance in a commercial, was not preempted by the fed-
eral copyright regime since the plaintiff did not seek to preclude the use of a copyrighted
composition but only the imitation of her voice. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462
(9th Cir. 1988). Since an action for unfair competition would seek to preclude use of certain
sounds and not the use of a copyrighted composition, such action would not logically be
preempted. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 1005-
31 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing tort liability for interference with prospective advantage)
[hereinafter PROSSER]. Similar in application to common law unfair competition actions is
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which provides for a cause of action for damages caused by
the use of a false description or designation of orgin in connection with goods or services. 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Section 43(a) has been used in cases of unfair competition involving
public confusion. See, e.g., Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Section 43(a) also has been used to allege a cause of action against the use of sampling. See,
e.g., Thomas v. Diamond, No. 87 Civ. 7048 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 1, 1987) cited in Soocher,
supra note 30, at 26.
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posed of various, related tort causes of action which seek to dis-
courage competition that unfairly interferes with the prospective
economic advantage of another. 5 It is conceivable that the courts
could expand the doctrine of unfair competition to accomondate
recording artists seeking protection from sampling. The two as-
pects of unfair competition which most directly bear on the issues
raised by digital sampling are the torts of "passing off" and
misappropriation.96
The mere imitation of a performance never has been pre-
cluded by statute or common law." Many have feared that grant-
ing performers exclusive rights against imitation would function as
a monopoly on gestures, voices, and sounds and would impede pro-
gress in the arts.98 However, performers, by virtue of the judicial
recognition of the tort of passing off, have received limited rights
to prevent imitations of their performance where the imitations are
similar enough to confuse the public as to the author's identity.9
Passing off occurs when the producer of a product or a work makes
a false representation which tends to induce buyers to believe that
the producer's product is that of another. 100 Indispensable to an
action for passing off is the plaintiff's showing that the defendant's
product caused or was likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff's
product.10
95. PROSSER, supra note 94, at 1013.
96. Appropriately enough, the differences between these torts parallel the copyright
law's distinction between imitation and duplication. However, the potential applicability of
unfair coitpetition notwithstanding, the absence of a uniform doctrine of unfair competition
makes generalizations about the ambit of its protection difficult.
97. See supra text accompanying note 52.
98. Comment, supra note 52, at 821.
99. Id. at 822. Some courts additionally have required that plaintiff and defendant be
in competition before an unfair competition claim would lie. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor
Co. 849 F.2d 460, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1988) (declining to find unfair competition where singer
and advertising agency were not in competition). However, other courts have not required
that the plaintiff and the defendant lie in direct competition. See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 491-92 (Sup.
Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951) (claiming that the
existence of actual competition between the parties is no longer a prerequisite to an unfair
competition action). To the extent that sampled musicians are in direct competition with
sampling musicians, the requirement would not preclude an action arising out of digital
sampling.
100. PRossER, supra note 94, at 1015. A paradigmatic example of passing off occurs
when a manufacturer purposely designs a product to resemble a better known brand of the
same product. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
101. PROSSER, supra note 94, at 1015-17. Some courts have required that plaintiff's
product must have acquired a "secondary meaning"-an identification between a product
and a manufacturer so clear that supply from any other source must be calculated to
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The tort of passing off has served as the basis for actions by
numerous performing artists against imitators of their voices or
styles of performing.1 0 2 A leading example is Lahr v. Adel.10 3 In
Lahr, comedian Bert Lahr sought an injunction and damages
against the defendant for its production of a television commercial
which featured a talking cartoon duck whose voice was an imita-
tion of Lahr's. The court granted relief based on the claim that the
defendant's imitation caused confusion as to the source of the
duck's voice and, as such, constituted a basic example of passing
off.' 4 The court noted that a performer's distinctive sound, though
not protected by copyright law or the common law against mere
imitation, still is entitled to some level of protection against imita-
tors where the confusion the imitation engenders is injurious to the
plaintiff's ability to earn a living through professional
performances."0 5
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held that Ford Motor Com-
pany's use of Bette Midler's rendition of "Do you Want to
Dance?" in one of its commercials was actionable under California
tort law as an appropriation of her identity. 0 8 While noting the
similarity between Midler's action and that in Lahr, the Midler
court declined to find unfair competiton because, since Midler did
deceive the public. See, e.g., Kirkland v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1111
(E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977). Secondary meaning, however, has been
interpreted by other courts as the equivalent of the likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Jack-
son v. Universal International Pictures, 36 Cal.2d 116, 222 P.2d 433 (1950) (en banc) (re-
jecting the view that secondary meaning requires an imitation product to conjure up the
name of the producer of the original product). Underlying the tort of passing off is a policy
judgement that confusion between products works to the ultimate disadvantage of the pub-
lic, as well as the plaintiff; the plaintiff, suffering from lost profits because of the confusion
caused by the defendant's marketing of a similar but cheaper product, has less incentive to
produce, and, if the plaintiff does scale back production, the public suffers from the de-
creased availability of quality products. Comment, supra note 52, at 822.
102. See supra note 99.
103. 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
104. Id. at 259.
105. Id. See also Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817, 379
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975) (holding that big-band leader Artie Shaw had no property right in his
sound which could preclude defendant from producing imitative records, but noting that if
the defendant's recordings caused confusion between Shaw's original recordings and defend-
ant's imitations, an action for passing off would lie).
106. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). The court distin-
guished Midler's action, which was based upon the uniqueness of her singing voice, from the
failed suit of Nancy Sinatra against Goodyear Tire, where Goodyear had used a Sinatra
sound-alike's rendition of a song made popular by Sinatra in one of its commercials. Id. at
462. Sinatra failed, the Midler court noted, because she sought damages from a defendant
who had bought a license to use the song and, as such, her claim was preempted under
federal copyright law. Id.
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not do commercials, the parties were not in competition. 0 ' The
court nevertheless emphasized that Ford's commercial created con-
fusion among the listening public, leaving listeners with the im-
pression that Midler had done the Ford commercial.'08
In recognizing the confusion created by Ford's commercial, the
Midler court strengthened the legal position of musicians who seek
to protect their unique sounds from being used by sampling musi-
cians. Sampling may create confusion among listeners; in addition,
sampled and sampling musicians may be in direct competition.
Consequently, a sampled musician may have a cause of action
against a sampler for unfair competition, even under the Midler
court's restrictive view.
B. Misappropriation
Unlike passing off, the tort of misappropriation recognizes a
quasi-property right in ideas and products which is not recognized
by copyright law. 09 Misappropriation, rather than focusing on the
degree of confusion a defendant's product causes, looks to factors
probative of pecuniary loss-for example, the amount of expertise
and labor exerted by a plaintiff in producing his product and the
presence of a competitive relationship between the parties."10 The
leading case dealing with misappropriation is International News
Service v. Associated Press,"' in which the Supreme Court consid-
ered the property rights held by a newspaper in the news reports it
produced. The case concerned the defendant newspaper's pirating
of the plaintiff newspaper's news reports, through a telegraph, for
use in the defendant's later editions. The news reports clearly were
not copyrightable as the underlying information was not the crea-
tion of the writer; however, the court held that the defendant's use
of its competitor's news was unfair competition." 2 Central to the
courts holding was the its recognition of the great expense and skill
necessary to collect the news, as well as the existence of a competi-
tive relationship between the parties." 3 The Court found that, al-
107. Id. at 462-63.
108. The court's emphasis on the confusion created by Ford's commercial is particu-
larly interesting because publicity actions do not require confusion for recovery. Note, The
Right of Publicity As A Means of Protecting Performer's Style, supra note 93, at 158 (pub-
licity rights may be usurped even without passing off).
109. PROSSER, supra note 94, at 1020.
110. Comment, supra note 52, at 842-43.
111. 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter INS].
112. Id. at 241.
113. Id. at 236-38.
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though the plaintiff may not be able to enforce property rights in
its news against the general population, against its competitors a
limited property right did exist, and, therefore, the defendant's ac-
tions constituted misappropriation.' 14
The development of the misappropriation doctrine was a judi-
cial response to the growth of advanced technologies which could
reproduce non-copyrighted works instead of merely imitating an-
other's product." 5 As INS demonstrates, the ability to precisely
reproduce non-copyrighted works, such as news reports, poses
problems beyond the traditional scope of passing off. In the misap-
propriation context the defendant does not pass off his own work
as that of the plaintiff; instead, he takes something from the plain-
tiff which he seeks to represent as his own. Hence, the traditional
remedy of passing off is not applicable. For this reason, the Court
in INS adopted a misappropriation standard.1 '
In the area of performances, the tort of passing off was in-
tended to protect the plaintiff from confusing imitations, regard-
less of whether the imitation contained a measure of originality.
The easy duplication of non-copyrighted works, the phenomenon
which the remedy of misappropriation attempts to prevent, entails
little, if any, originality on the part of the duplicating party.
A paradigm of misappropriation is exemplified by the phe-
nomenon of record piracy."' A recording artist might spend much
time and energy producing a record only to have unauthorized du-
plications marketed. Little would be gained artistically since the
pirate's duplication would add nothing of value to the recording.
However, because the pirates made no fraudulent representations
causing public confusion as to who was the author of the works, a
traditional action for passing off could not be maintained. As a re-
sult, the courts developed the tort of misappropriation to deal with
114. Id. at 242.
115. Simon, Right of Publicity Reified: Fame As Business Asset, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 699, 726 (1985); Comment, supra note 52, at 822.
116. INS at 241-42. This is not to suggest, however, that passing off never can be
applied in a misappropriation context. As Justice Holmes suggested in his concurrence in
INS, the primary requirement of passing off is a misrepresentation which gives the defend-
ant an advantage over the plaintiff which the law considers undesirable. Id. at 247 (Holmes,
J., concurring). Rather than recognizing a separate misappropriation tort as the majority
did, Holmes found the defendant's use of its rival's news reports actionable as passing off,
even though it occurred in reverse form. Id.
117. For examples of misappropriation actions brought in the context of record piracy,
see A&M Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Distributing Corp., 574 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1978) and Mer-
cury Record Productions, Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis.2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 914 (1975).
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such situations.
As the preceding discussion suggests, claims for misappropria-
tion primarily are limited to circumstances involving actual dupli-
cation of the work of a competitor. Misappropriation never has
been used successfully to preclude imitations of a performer.1 " For
example, in Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive, Inc., 119 the plaintiff ar-
gued that the defendant's imitation of the plaintiff's distinctive vo-
cal representation of a popular television show character in a com-
mercial constituted unfair competition under New York law.
However, the plaintiff did not allege that any confusion resulted as
to the source of the voice. The court reaffirmed the view that mere
imitations do not constitute unfair competition and held for the
defendant. 120 More importantly, however, the Court distinguished
imitations from misappropriation, stating that a showing of the
latter would require actual duplication of the plaintiff's voice by
the defendant.' 2'
As with federal copyright law, the question of whether the
remedy of unfair competition is available to recording artists
against users of digital sampling is, in large measure, answered by
determining whether sampled sounds are sufficiently original to
merit protection. If samples could be analogized to a rerecording of
the original artist's work, a rerecording devoid of any meaningful
artistic contribution by the sampling artist, it seems clear that an
action for misappropriation would lie. The parties are, after all,
clearly in competition for a share of the music purchasing market
and the development of a distinctive musical sound is often an ar-
duous task. If, however, as the preceding analysis suggests, digital
samples do represent an original contribution on the part of the
sampling musician, then unfair competition would protect the
sampled musician only if the use of sampling confuses the public
as to the author of the work. In this case, sampled musicians would
be protected irrespective of the amount of originality present in
their finished product.
A situation in which a recording artist's distinctive sound was
used in the recording of another through digital sampling would
not be a typical case of passing off. In fact, since the sampling mu-
sician does not present the sound produced as that of the sampled
musician but rather presents it as his own, the traditional passing
118. PROSSER, supra note 94, at 1020 n.53.
119. 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y 1973).
120. Id. at 346.
121. Id.
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off scenario would be reversed. Now, the sound of the sampled mu-
sician is presented as that of the sampling musician. However, as
Holmes' INS concurrence suggests, the inapplicability of passing
off to situations where the defendant represents the plaintiff's
work as his own is more form than substance.'22 The gravamen of a
passing off claim is a representation which tends to confuse the
buyer as to the producer's or the author's identity. Beyond the
purely traditional requirement that the defendant's product be
confused with the plaintiff's, there appears to be no reason not to
extend the tort to reverse situations.'23 Digital sampling clearly can
fit this mold. When a recording contains a sample of a well-known
musician's signature sound it is not unrealistic to suppose that
confusion might result as to the identity of the sound's author.
IV. Conclusion
The Copyright Act, as currently written, is insufficient to pro-
tect performers and their sounds from sampling. However, the doc-
trine of unfair competition appears to succeed where copyright law
fails. The tort of passing off, due to its malleability, seems to have
some applicability to the problems raised by digital sampling. Be-
cause the concept of passing off is not predicated upon property
rights but, instead, upon a need to prevent certain kinds of unde-
sirable competition, a sampled performer who brings an action for
passing off need not be concerned with the degree of originality,
merely the degree of confusion. Simply put, the degree of original-
ity added by a sampling musician is irrelevant to an action for
passing off. Consequently, the doctrine of unfair competition pres-
ently is better suited than copyright law to provide protection to
performers against tortious injury at the hands of second order
technologies such as digital sampling.
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122. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246-48 (1918)
(Holmes, J., concurring).
123. A somewhat analogous situation called "reverse confusion," where confusion be-
tween plaintiff's relatively unknown goods and those of a well-known defendant occurs, has
been recognized as actionable passing off. See Big 0 Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
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